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Abstract   
When stakeholder protection is left to the voluntary initiative of managers, relations with social activists may 
become an effective entrenchment strategy for inefficient CEOs. We thus argue that managerial turnover and 
firm value are increased when explicit stakeholder protection is introduced so as to deprive incumbent CEOs of 
activists’ support. This finding provides a rationale for the emergence of specialized institutions (social auditors 
and ethic indexes) that help firms commit to stakeholder protection even in case of managerial replacement. Our 
theory also explains a recent trend whereby social activist organizations and institutional shareholders are 
showing a growing support for each others’ agenda. 
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When stakeholder protection is left to the voluntary initiative of managers, relations with
stakeholders and social activists may turn into a powerful entrenchment strategy for incum-
bent CEOs. This is particularly true in countries and periods where political lobbying, social
activism and media campaigns have the power to promote or disgrace top executives of large
corporations. Ineﬃcient managers have then a special motive for committing themselves to
a socially responsible behavior that gains stakeholders’ support. This paper suggests that
explicit stakeholder protection - whether enforced by courts and regulators, or by private
monitoring institutions specialized in corporate social responsibility (CSR) issues - can break
this alliance, thus favoring control contestability and managerial turnover.
There is by now a large consensus that stakeholders enjoy substantial eﬀective control
on ﬁrms by the threat of costly boycotts and media campaigns. 1 Local communities, unions
and environmental organizations also interfere in corporate governance matters by acting
as “white squires” to block hostile takeovers. Indeed, some recent controversial takeover
contests displayed incumbent CEOs relying on activists’ and media support to buttress their
positions. When in 1997 the German steel producer Krupp-Hoesch launched a hostile bid
over its competitor Thyssen with the assistance of Deutsche Bank, Thyssen’s management
spurred local communities and politicians to lobby against the takeover. Harsh criticisms
from the German public and political pressures from the regional government of North Rhine-
Westphalia led Krupp to withdraw its bid (see Hellwig 2000). Intense media campaigns
against corporate takeovers have also been led by environmental activists. In 1986 a group
of environmental organizations including Sierra Club and Earth First! started a campaign
against the acquisition of Paciﬁc Lumber, a timber company, by MAXXAM, on the grounds
that Paciﬁc Lumber’s management was a more reliable “partner” for the environment and
local communities. The media largely supported the view that Paciﬁc Lumber’s old man-
agement had gained “a reputation for enlightened management of its trees and benevolent
paternalism for its people...,” 2 while neglecting the many ﬁnancial indicators suggesting it
was highly ineﬃcient. On the contrary, MAXXAM CEO’s Charles Hurwitz was depicted as
the utmost example of the evil corporate raider, mainly interested in extracting proﬁts from
the acquired company at the expense of stakeholders. Although the acquisition succeeded in
spite of the protests, this case well illustrates the process whereby the media helped NGOs
to spread a negative view of the 1980’s takeover wave (see DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1998)
for a detailed report of the Paciﬁc Lumber case and its extensive media coverage).
Recent takeover battles in the European telecoms, banking and energy industries also
1help illustrate how connections with local communities, politicians, and unions represent
a valuable entrenchment tool for incumbent managers. Interestingly, political and media
support against outside raiders has become even more valuable to incumbent CEOs since
EC Directives and EU member states’ reforms have made it more diﬃcult to resort to
standard anti-takeover defensive tactics. 3
In line with this evidence, we propose a simple model where stakeholders other than
shareholders 4 can aﬀect the likelihood of CEO replacement, and incumbent CEOs can make
manager-speciﬁc commitments to adopt a stakeholder-friendly behavior. This subtle en-
trenchment strategy becomes more appealing to CEOs when corporate law and the ﬁrm’s
charter promote independent boards, proxy ﬁghts and hostile takeovers. When deciding
whether to support the incumbent CEO against a takeover or a proxy ﬁght, stakeholder
activists trade oﬀ the cost of a less talented manager against the beneﬁt of managerial
concessions. The latter are less valuable if stakeholders expect to receive a fair treatment in-
dependently of who runs the ﬁrm. Within this framework, we show the following facts. First,
when private beneﬁts of control are large and stakeholder activism is eﬀective, shareholder
value is enhanced when explicit stakeholder protection is introduced, so as to undermine cor-
porate oﬃcers’ entrenchment strategies. Our theory thus rationalizes why ﬁrms increasingly
submit their behavior to the monitoring of ethic indexes and social auditors in an attempt
to make CEOs less central to relations with stakeholders. Second, we show that although
stakeholders may support an ineﬃcient CEO committed to a socially responsible behavior
against an alternative manager, stakeholder welfare is always increasing in the degree of
control contestability. This is because CEOs who can rely on anti-takeover defenses and
dominated boards do not need stakeholders’ support to buttress their positions. In light of
the former ﬁndings, stakeholders and shareholders have more interests in common than one
would expect. Finally, we show that ineﬃcient CEOs are always opposed to any institution-
alization of stakeholder protection which would deprive them of discretionality over CSR
and thus of their grip on stakeholders.
Our work contributes to rationalize a recent trend whereby social activists and share-
holders are growing increasingly supportive of each others’ agendas, as corroborated by the
following stylized facts:
Shareholders’ support for explicit stakeholder protection.
Mainstream shareholder activists and institutional investors are asking ﬁrms to institu-
tionalize stakeholder protection, rather than leave it in the hands of CEOs. Firms then
resort to specialized institutions whose role is to monitor their environmental and social
2performance and report it to the public. Indeed, consulting ﬁrms are increasingly special-
izing in social auditing, while stock market ethic indexes are being created to respond to
shareholders’ demand for certiﬁed “ethic stocks.”5 Our theory adds to the common wisdom
explanation for this phenomenon - i.e. that shareholders endorse explicit CSR measures sim-
ply because they fear costly boycotts - by linking shareholder value, corporate governance
factors, and CSR. In particular, while the boycott rationale implies that in the presence of
powerful activists shareholders beneﬁt from the stock’s inclusion in sustainability indexes,
our model yields the additional prediction that ﬁrms’ incentive to undergo ethical screening
for inclusion in such indexes is stronger when corporate control is more contestable.
Social activists’ interest for corporate governance issues.
Social and environmental activists are increasingly involved in the corporate governance
debate. Many activists have in fact joined forces with shareholders’ lobbies to campaign
against anti-takeover devices, CEO-dominated boards and lenient auditors, issues that used
to be well beyond the traditional social activism program. 6 While social activists may en-
dorse independent boards and shareholder voice to the extent that institutional investors are
likely to promote stakeholder interests within the ﬁrm’s board, it remains puzzling that they
advocate pro-takeover reforms of corporate charters. 7 Our paper proposes an explanation
for this latter fact. 8
This paper contributes to the current debate on the stakeholder society (see Hellwig
2000, and Tirole 2001), trying to assess who has an interest in endorsing a stakeholder
society concept, whereby managers are intended to have a multiple mission of aiming at
both shareholder value and stakeholder welfare. We wonder whether both stakeholders
and shareholders may not be better oﬀ when managers are bound to maximize shareholder
value, while clear covenants restricting the ﬁrms’ set of actions are established either by ﬁrm
charters or by the law to rule out actions that may impose large negative externalities on
stakeholders. Tirole (2001) argues that putting in place managerial incentives and control
structures that ensure ﬁrms’ respect of stakeholder rights may be very costly. Our paper
shows that the decision not to institutionalize stakeholder protection may prove even costlier,
leaving managers with the monopoly of relationships with stakeholders. In other words, the
lack of rules on corporate behavior is not always a synonymous for ﬁrm proﬁtability and
shareholder value; often, it is only an excuse for managerial discretion (see Jensen (2002)).
Our work is related to Pagano and Volpin (2005a), who analyze the behavior of incum-
bent managers and workers in a ﬁrm faced with a hostile takeover threat, and argue that
incumbents are natural allies of workers: the former have an interest in oﬀering long-term
3contracts to workers so as to discourage the takeover, while the latter are likely to support
a lazy manager prone to low monitoring against a more eﬃcient raider. Contrary to our
theory, in their model incumbent managers can only gain, and shareholders lose, from any
institutionalization of stakeholder protection. The paper is also related to the recent liter-
ature on the political economy of corporate governance (see Pagano and Volpin 2005b, and
Perotti and von Thadden 2006 for the relevant references), to the extent that our results may
be applied to a political economy framework in order to study how corporate governance
and stakeholder protection laws and regulations are simultaneously determined.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we set up the basic model. We rule out
potential collusion between incumbent managers and stakeholders, and study how share-
holder value and stakeholder welfare are aﬀected by stakeholder protection and corporate
governance. In section 3, we assume that incumbent managers can commit to a stakeholder-
friendly behavior in order to obtain stakeholders’ support against a replacement attempt.
There, we also study under which conditions an alliance between managers and stakehold-
ers arises. In section 4, we analyze shareholders’, stakeholders’ and incumbent managers’
preferences over corporate governance and explicit stakeholder protection. In section 5 we
comment on our results.
2 The model
Consider a ﬁrm run by a manager (I) enjoying a large private beneﬁt of control γ from
running the ﬁrm. A fraction of shares α is held by the manager, while (1 − α) shares are
dispersed among small shareholders (SH). Dispersed shareholders have no control over the
ﬁrm’s course of action. The ﬁrm generates both a monetary proﬁt, which accrues to its
owners, and a non-monetary externality on its other stakeholders (ST). We think of natural
stakeholders like potential pollutees, customers, workers or local communities. Stakeholders
derive no utility from money. All agents in the model are risk-neutral.
Projects
The model we have in mind is suited to describe the early stages of new product de-
velopment, when ﬁrms do not know yet to which extent their proﬁt maximizing choices will
impose costs on stakeholders. Of course, based on industry factors and the current state of
technological and scientiﬁc knowledge, they have a subjective assessment of how likely such a
conﬂict is to arise. Consider the following example. A ﬁrm is developing a new product, and
has to choose between alternative production processes: before the R&D stage is completed,
4not much is known about the payoﬀs associated to diﬀerent technologies; hence, no project
will be chosen until further research is successfully completed under the CEO’s supervision.
Both shareholders and stakeholders anticipate that the ﬁrm will eventually face a choice
between a few (say, 2) relevant alternatives. Of these, one technology will be more proﬁtable
than the other. Both technologies may require that consumer/environmental safety is partly
sacriﬁced. The ﬁrm and its stakeholders anticipate that with a non-zero probability the
least proﬁtable technology will be the least safe for consumers and the environment; hence,
they expect that their preferences will sometimes coincide. This situation is captured by the
following hypotheses.
Incomplete contracting framework - The ﬁrm’s manager can either run the status quo project,
or try to improve on it by discovering a new project. The status quo project (project zero)
is highly disliked by both shareholders and stakeholders in that it yields zero proﬁts to
shareholders and no private beneﬁt to stakeholders. There are also N a priori identical
projects, which yield a veriﬁable monetary proﬁt R with ex-ante unknown probabilities, an
ex-ante unknown (non-veriﬁable) private beneﬁt to stakeholders, and can possibly impose a
cost on the ﬁrm and/or on its stakeholders. Note that in our incomplete contracting setting,
all projects look the same ex-ante: payoﬀs cannot be attached to new projects unless further
investigation is carried out. This assumption captures a major feature of ﬁrm management in
R&D-intensive industries, where at the early stages of product development, ﬁrms (and their
stakeholders) are aware of the available alternatives (e.g. diﬀerent research methodologies,
or “technology trajectories”), but cannot assign diﬀerent payoﬀs to each of them. This
is the case, for example, when a pharmaceutical ﬁrm can orient its research towards the
development of diﬀerent drugs, whose potential market demand, cost eﬀectiveness – as well
as impact on consumer safety – are still unknown.
It is known that (N −2) projects are worse than project 0 for both SH and ST, and that
at least one of them imposes a “suﬃciently large” cost on both (one may think of this as an
R&D project which has disastrous consequences for the ﬁrms’ proﬁts, and also turns out to
have a very negative impact on stakeholders). This assumption ensures that a party who is
uninformed about the projects’ payoﬀs always prefers the status quo to picking a project at
random. Hence, if a diﬀerent project from the status quo is to be selected, the controlling
party in the ﬁrm must have discovered the payoﬀs attached to all alternative projects. In
this setting, a “more talented” manager is one that is better able to discover project payoﬀs,
and thus to improve on the status quo.
Congruence of preferences over alternative projects - It is common knowledge that as N −2
5projects are worse than the status-quo, upon information collection the choice will focus on
two “relevant projects,” whose expected monetary payoﬀs to shareholders and externalities
on stakeholders are displayed in table 1.
[Table 1 about here.]
According to the table, the shareholders’ preferred project (say, project 1) yields proﬁt
R with probability p + τ. Project 2 instead yields R only with probability p, and is thus
the project that shareholders like the least. With probability λ, project 1 generates a pos-
itive externality B > 0 on stakeholders (whereas project 2 does not), and is thus also the
stakeholders’ favorite one.9 Conversely, with probability (1 − λ), the shareholder’s pre-
ferred project yields no private beneﬁt to stakeholders, while the less proﬁtable project 2
does. Hence, the parameter λ measures the congruence of interests between shareholders
and stakeholders; alternatively, (1 − λ) captures the trade oﬀ between proﬁt maximization
and social/environmental objectives. 10
We assume that the degree of congruence λ is common knowledge at the onset of the cor-
porate governance game, and that λ belongs to (0,1): before project payoﬀs are discovered,
stakeholders and shareholders expect that their favorite projects will sometimes coincide.
Our assumption that λ ∈ (0,1) allows to encompass both those cases where socially respon-
sible actions impose extra costs on the ﬁrm, as well as those cases where projects increasing
stakeholders’ payoﬀs also maximize shareholder value. This occurs for instance when a ﬁrm
follows an enlightened employee policy that boosts workers’ morale and productivity (see
Huselid (1995) for evidence on this), or when the ﬁrm’s adoption of a green technology en-
sures a high demand for its product and contributes to reduce production costs (empirical
evidence showing that this is quite a common pattern abounds. See for instance Klassen
and McLaughlin (1996), and Dowell, Hart, and Yeung (2000)).
Managerial talent
A manager i learns the new projects’ payoﬀs with probability θi, in which case she selects
the one she prefers the most. With probability (1−θi), the manager does not learn anything;
hence, she optimally decides to run the status quo project. We deﬁne θi to be the managerial
talent for innovation. The incumbent CEO has talent θI. A better alternative manager, with
talent θR > θI is known to exist. However, she still has to be identiﬁed in the managerial
labor market. We deﬁne ∆θ ≡ θR − θI.
CEO replacement attempts
6We assume that with probability π ∈ [0,1] the board of directors or a coalition of share-
holders identiﬁes the alternative manager; alternatively, the latter realizes that he can in-
crease the ﬁrm’s value and launches a hostile bid on the ﬁrm. π thus captures those legal
and contractual factors that favor CEO replacement by: (i) facilitating the identiﬁcation of
an alternative manager by shareholders (e.g., board independence, rules reducing the cost
of shareholder activism and proxy ﬁghts); (ii) encouraging outsiders’ acquisition of control
through hostile bids (e.g., regulatory and charter provisions that limit the set of anti-takeover
defenses available to CEOs).
Stakeholder activism
When a replacement attempt occurs, stakeholder representatives such as social and en-
vironmental activists or local communities may side with the incumbent CEO to make sure
that she is not replaced. Activists dispose of powerful tools in this respect: they may start a
media campaign and even threaten a boycott in case the replacement occurs; alternatively,
by exerting pressure on political leaders to back their cause, they can create an adverse polit-
ical climate to the proxy ﬁght or the takeover (Hellwig 2000). We assume that, a stakeholder
campaign succeeds with probability a in deterring CEO replacement, where a ∈ (0,1), and
fails with probability (1 − a). We also assume that stakeholders do not choose the intensity
of the campaigning activity, but only whether to campaign or not (hence a is an exogenous
parameter measuring the eﬃcacy of activism), and that a stakeholder campaign is costless
(the cost of campaigning could be taken into account in the model without changing its
qualitative results).
Notice that while π captures those charter provisions facilitating CEO turnover, and thus
can be aﬀected by shareholders, a proxies for the eﬀectiveness of stakeholders in interfering
in the corporate governance game. It is true that shareholder activists are as well likely
to turn to “non-governance” channels (e.g., media campaigns) to support the raider in his
takeover attempt. Accounting for this eﬀect would call for a more general approach whereby
the relative impact of ST and SH on the takeover contest is the outcome of a lobbying game,
whose equilibrium may well have shareholders “get the upper hand” (a = 0). 11 However,
the evidence we presented in the introduction seems to suggest that stakeholders have a
comparative advantage in relying on non-conventional voice tools. This, in our opinion,
justiﬁes the assumption that a > 0 (see however Remark 2, p. 17 on this).
Formal stakeholder protection
The ﬁrm’s choice of a course of action may be constrained by stakeholder protection rules.
7We model this by assuming that – once projects are discovered – with probability xr ∈ [0,1)
the manager is obliged to pick the project yielding B to stakeholders, independently of
whether this maximizes proﬁts. Thus, with probability (1 − λ)xr stakeholder protection
is detrimental to shareholder interests. In other words, an ex-ante commitment to CSR
imposes an extra cost on the ﬁrm only with probability (1 − λ), as with probability λ the
proﬁt-maximizing project is also socially responsible. In line with Baron (2001), we might
say that λxr measures the extent of “strategic corporate social responsibility” going on in
the ﬁrm.
The variable xr has two interpretations. (a) Legal Stakeholder Protection – A regulatory
agency with the unique objective of maximizing stakeholder welfare has the formal right to
make binding recommendations over the choice of projects (for instance, it may rule out
projects requiring a polluting production process or impose a minimal standard of safety for
consumers and workers). However, it eﬀectively exerts this right only if it is informed about
the projects’ payoﬀs, which happens with probability xr ∈ [0,1). 12 We think of xr as being
inversely related to the authority’s degree of overload, and directly related to the quality of
its staﬀ and the resources on which it can draw to pursue its investigations and enforce its
decisions. 13 (b) Contractual Stakeholder Protection – The ﬁrm commits to a CSR policy of
ruling out projects that yield very low outcomes to stakeholders (i.e., B = 0). To stick to
its commitment the ﬁrm buys the services of a monitor specialized in social responsibility
issues, such as an ethic index or a social auditor; the intensity of such monitoring determines
the extent of the ﬁrm’s compliance (xr) with stakeholder protection.
Timing
The timing of events is described in ﬁgure 1. At t = 1, with probability π an alternative
manager challenges the incumbent CEO. If so, stakeholders may campaign and threaten a
boycott against the potential new management. The campaign succeeds with probability
a. At t = 2, the manager who is in control learns the payoﬀs and selects a new project
with probability θi (i = I,R). If stakeholder protection rules are enforced, the manager has
to comply with them; otherwise, she is free to choose her most favored project. At t = 3,
monetary payoﬀs accrue to shareholders and the manager (who also enjoys the private beneﬁt
of control γ), while stakeholders bear the externalities generated by the ﬁrm’s activity. In
section 3, we will assume that at an initial date t = 0 the incumbent CEO can make a
manager-speciﬁc investment to credibly commit herself to a socially responsible behavior, so
as to establish a privileged relationship with powerful stakeholder activists.
[Figure 1 about here.]
82.1 CSR and the (potential) conﬂict between shareholders and
stakeholders
Our framework is meant to capture various realistic features of the (potential) conﬂict be-
tween shareholders and stakeholders that in our view should be incorporated in a model of
corporate social responsibility.
First, shareholders and stakeholders do not simply bargain over how to share the cor-
porate pie; they mostly dispute which course of action the ﬁrm should undertake, a feature
that calls for a control rights model. This fact also motivates our simplifying assumption
that stakeholders are not sensitive to monetary incentives. In fact, including a monetary
component in the stakeholders’ utility function would raise the additional issue that stake-
holders may be compensated via lump sum transfers such as charitable contributions for
the externalities they bear. For instance, the local community may receive a large donation
upon the ﬁrm’s introduction of a downsizing plan or its adoption of a polluting technology.
Although this is what often happens in reality, it is also true that real-world stakeholders
do not seem to regard monetary transfers as a perfect substitute for the indirect control on
the ﬁrm’s choices guaranteed by CSR and media campaigns. A further issue that would be
raised by stakeholders’ taste for money is that market mechanisms (e.g. tradable pollution
permits) might lead the ﬁrm to internalize the externalities produced, thus solving the con-
ﬂict between shareholders and stakeholders. Ruling out such market solutions allows instead
to account for the large non-monetary value that stakeholders seem to attribute to control
on the ﬁrm’s actions, so as to study the role of stakeholder activists, i.e. those “players that
seek to change the practices of a ﬁrm” (Baron, 2001). Finally, allowing for monetary trans-
fers would also open the possibility that “nasty activists” blackmail the ﬁrm by threatening
media campaigns and boycotts. Though this is an interesting issue per se, ruling it out helps
focus on the paper’s bottom line, i.e. the role of “genuine” activists.
A second feature of our model that we would like to emphasize is that it accounts for the
fact that while shareholders’ and stakeholders’ preferences over alternative actions are often
in conﬂict, in many real life cases socially responsible actions are also proﬁt-maximizing. This
justiﬁes our adoption of the Aghion and Tirole (1997) setup, with λ ∈ (0,1) capturing the
extent of such congruence. This framework also allows to encompass both “strategic CSR,”
whereby the ﬁrm adopts a course of action that is good for stakeholders but nonetheless
maximizes proﬁts, and more genuine CSR, i.e. those “changes in business practice that are
in contrast with proﬁt maximization” (Baron 2001).
92.2 The benchmark with no social activism
In this section we study the basic model where incumbent CEOs cannot entrench themselves
by building relationships with stakeholders (i.e., events in ﬁgure 1 occur from t = 1). We
look at the impact of control contestability (π) and explicit stakeholder protection (xr) on
shareholder value, stakeholder welfare and the incumbent’s utility.
In this benchmark case, at t = 2, whenever free from regulatory interference, any manager
chooses the project which maximizes equity value. As the incumbent manager’s preferences
are not more congruent with stakeholders than the raider’s, stakeholders beneﬁt when a
more eﬃcient manager takes over:
θR [λ + (1 − λ)xr]B > θI [λ + (1 − λ)xr]B.
A better manager discovers new projects more often (θR > θI); yet, both the incumbent CEO
and the alternative manager pick the stakeholders’ favorite project only with probability
λ+(1−λ)xr (either the project maximizes ﬁrm proﬁts as well, or it is imposed on the ﬁrm
by the regulatory agency/corporate social responsibility monitor).
It is immediate that social activists have no interest in supporting the incumbent CEO
at t = 1. Hence, if a raider appears the manager is always replaced. Given this, shareholder
value is:
VSH(π,xr) = (1)
= πθR [xr(p + λτ) + (1 − xr)(p + τ)]R + (1 − π)θI [xr(p + λτ) + (1 − xr)(p + τ)]R
= (θI + π∆θ)[p + τ − (1 − λ)τxr]R,
where expected project returns under the relevant regulatory constraints are multiplied by
the expected managerial quality θI + π∆θ. Stakeholder welfare also depends on project
choice and expected managerial quality:
WST(π,xr) = πθR [xr + (1 − xr)λ]B + (1 − π)θI [xr + (1 − xr)λ]B (2)
= (θI + π∆θ)[λ + (1 − λ)xr]B.
Finally, the incumbent manager’s utility is:
UI(π,xr) = (1 − π)[γ + θI (p + τ − (1 − λ)τxr)αR] + πθR (p + τ − (1 − λ)τxr)αR.
10An incumbent CEO with a high enough stake might be better oﬀ in case she is replaced, to
the extent that the additional value of her equity oﬀsets the lost beneﬁts of control. Here,
however, we want to focus on CEOs whose private beneﬁts of control are suﬃciently large
relative to their equity stake that they always want to stay on (see page 15 for a discussion
of the restrictions imposed on the managerial equity stake in the model). Hence, we make
the following assumption:
Assumption 1
γ > ∆θ(p + τ)αR.
In the following Lemma we describe the preferences of all agents (stakeholders, share-
holders, and incumbent CEO) with respect to control contestability and formal stakeholder
protection.
Lemma 1 An increase in control contestability increases stakeholder welfare and share-
holder value, and decreases managerial utility. An increase in formal stakeholder protection
increases stakeholder welfare, and decreases both shareholder value and managerial utility.
Notice that while shareholders and stakeholders have dissonant preferences over the ex-
tent of stakeholder protection, they are both better oﬀ under a tighter corporate governance
regime. Indeed - although their views may diﬀer on which is the best project to adopt - both
stakeholders and shareholders have a common interest in enhancing managerial turnover.
The reason for this is that in our model new managers increase the corporate pie rather
than redistribute it from shareholders to stakeholders. Indeed, shareholder value need not
necessarily be created at the expense of stakeholder welfare; indeed, it is often the case that
more eﬃcient and innovative managers, by increasing the size of the corporate pie, beneﬁt
both shareholders and stakeholders. 14
Let us also stress that in this basic model, both shareholders and incumbent managers
beneﬁt from a weak stakeholder protection, whereas stakeholders and incumbent managers
have no common interests. Moreover, shareholder value is maximized when π and xr are
respectively close to 1 and 0, that is, when the quality of corporate governance is high
while stakeholder protection is minimized. In what follows, we allow stakeholder activists to
campaign against the potential new manager, so that the incumbent CEO has an interest
to commit to make concessions to stakeholders. As we will see, this changes dramatically
shareholders’ preferences over corporate governance and stakeholder protection.
113 Stakeholder activism and managerial entrenchment
We now assume that stakeholder activism can reduce the likelihood of CEO replacement,
and show that at t = 0 the incumbent manager may try to entrench herself by building a
privileged relationship with stakeholders. The story we have in mind is one where the CEO
achieves a credible commitment to be friendly to stakeholders through manager-speciﬁc in-
vestments (see Shleifer and Vishny 1989) that align her preferences with those of stakehold-
ers. One instance of such investment is the acquisition of expertise in implementing socially
responsible policies and sustainable production processes (e.g., through specialized executive
courses), that will later turn stakeholder-friendly projects into “pet projects” for the CEO.
A further example is that of a manager who spends long hours gathering the advice of,
and building relationships with, NGO representatives, local communities and environmen-
talists. 15 Finally, the CEO can start a parallel career in a social activist organization, and
enjoy personal gratiﬁcation from being praised by other members (e.g. William Clay Ford
Jr., Ford’s CEO, engaging in active membership of the environmental NGO Sierra Club).
She may then have an incentive to distort managerial choices so as to preserve her “member-
ship” to this social network. More generally, she can develop a reputation for being lenient
to stakeholders’ requests.
We model this idea in the following way. At t = 0, the CEO can make an observable,
manager-speciﬁc investment in CSR expertise. If she invests xc at cost bxc, with probability
xc she enjoys a private beneﬁt b when implementing stakeholder-friendly projects in the ﬁrm
she runs. Our assumption that the CSR investment cost equals the expected private beneﬁt
of stakeholder-friendly projects implies that the investment is (weakly) never proﬁtable unless
it is part of an entrenchment strategy. In case of replacement, the CEO enjoys some private
beneﬁts anyways thanks to the human capital acquired through the investment. We will
assume for simplicity that these amount to bxc (the case where fewer private beneﬁts are
enjoyed in case of replacement yields the same qualitative results, though at the expense of
more cumbersome algebra). The investment in CSR expertise and stakeholder-relationships
is not feasible to outside managers.16 We also assume:
Assumption 2
b > ατR.
This implies that when an investment xc is undertaken, with probability xc the manager
picks the stakeholders’ favorite project even at the expense of security beneﬁts so as to enjoy
12the private beneﬁt b. With probability (1 − xc), the manager gains no expertise and her
preferences are congruent with shareholders’; in this case, she only picks the stakeholders’
favorite project with probability λ. This directly implies the following lemma:
Lemma 2 The degree of congruence between the incumbent manager’s and the stakehold-
ers’ objectives is measured by λ + (1 − λ)xc; it increases from λ to 1 as the CEO increases
her investment in CSR expertise xc from 0 to 1.
xc thus measures the amount of managerial concessions to stakeholders. At t = 1,
stakeholders are willing to support the incumbent CEO provided xc satisﬁes the following
constraint:
θI [λ + (1 − λ)xr + (1 − λ)(1 − xr)xc]B ≥ θR [λ + (1 − λ)xr]B,
which can be written as:
θI(1 − xr)(1 − λ)Bxc ≥ ∆θ[λ + (1 − λ)xr]B.
The value of concessions expected under the incumbent CEO outweigh the cost for stakehold-
ers of bearing a less eﬃcient manager. This constraint implies that managerial concessions
must be suﬃciently large, i.e.:
xc ≥ xc(xr) ≡
∆θ[λ + (1 − λ)xr]
θI(1 − xr)(1 − λ)
. (3)
Notice that xc(xr) is increasing in xr, i.e., the minimum investment in stakeholder relation-
ships to gain activists’ support increases with the level of explicit stakeholder protection.
Indeed, when stakeholder protection is strong, activists have less reason to support an inef-
ﬁcient CEO.
On the other hand, the incumbent CEO is willing to invest in stakeholder relationships
if and only if the following condition is satisﬁed:
πa{γ − α∆θR[(p + τ) − (1 − λ)xrτ]} ≥ (1 − π + πa)θIαR(1 − λ)(1 − xr)τxc.
The left hand side of the above inequality represents the net expected gain from receiving
stakeholders support: in the event that the takeover is attempted and the stakeholder cam-
paign succeeds (which occurs with probability πa), the CEO preserves the private beneﬁt of
13control γ while bearing the monetary cost of a less valuable equity stake. The right hand side
represents instead the loss in value of the CEO’s equity stake due to managerial concessions
(which are granted whenever the CEO stays in power, i.e. with probability 1 − π + πa).
The above condition can be rewritten as follows:
xc ≤ xc(xr) ≡
πa{γ − α∆θR[(p + τ) − (1 − λ)xrτ]}
(1 − π + πa)[θIαR(1 − λ)(1 − xr)τ]
. (4)
Note that the “alliance” between the CEO and the ﬁrm’s stakeholders will be feasible if and
only if xc(xr) ≥ xc(xr).
A ﬁrst inspection of condition (4) allows us to state the following lemma:
Lemma 3 The incumbent CEO is more willing to invest in stakeholder relationships (namely,
xc is larger) when she is under a tougher replacement threat (i.e. π is higher), and when
social activism is more eﬀective (i.e. a is larger).
When good corporate governance deprives managers of standard tools to protect their
jobs (such as anti-takeover defenses and CEO-dominated boards) CEOs turn to subtler
ways to stay in power. Moreover, as the eﬀectiveness of social activists’ campaigns increases,
investments in CSR expertise and close relationships with stakeholder representatives become
powerful entrenchment tools.
Notice also that consistently with intuition, managerial concessions xc are increasing
in the level of private beneﬁts of control (γ), and provided γ is large enough (see further,
assumption 3) also in the degree of congruence (λ). Indeed, a manager earning larger private
beneﬁts of control is more eager to make concessions in order to entrench herself. The
same occurs if the monetary cost of managerial concessions is small, as when there is little
trade-oﬀ between proﬁt maximization and social/environmental objectives. Furthermore,
xc is increasing in the level of legal stakeholder protection (xr): the CEO is more eager to
retain control when stakeholders enjoy a considerable level of legal protection, to the extent
that under her (less eﬃcient) management the value of her equity share is little aﬀected by
stakeholder protection rules. On the other hand, xc decreases in the manager’s stake (αR), in
the probability of the project success p, and in the talent gap between raider and incumbent
managers (∆θ): an increase in any of the latter parameters increases the expected monetary
cost that entrenchment imposes on the manager via her equity stake, thus making the CEO






as a measure of the relative importance of private beneﬁts of control versus monetary returns
in the CEO’s objective function. This variable is of crucial importance to our results; indeed,
only when control beneﬁts are large enough compared to the managerial equity stake (i.e.,
when Γ is “large”), is the CEO willing to resist a replacement, even undergoing the cost
of pro-stakeholder concessions. One may argue that increasing the CEO’s equity stake α
would allow for a straightforward remedy to the managerial entrenchment problem. Indeed,
a similar caveat applies to many corporate governance models of managerial entrenchment,
starting with Shleifer and Vishny (1989, p. 129). One reply to this objection is that if large
equity stakes were an eﬀective and cheap instrument to deter managerial entrenchment,
we would not observe top executives resorting to anti-takeover defenses and engaging in
creative self-entrenchment strategies, as we in fact do. In line with this reasoning we have
decided to focus our attention on a single corporate governance mechanism (the replacement
threat π), rather than studying the interaction between implicit and monetary incentives
for managers. 17 Notice also that the assumption that the CEO’s equity share α is small
is well-grounded in reality. Jensen and Murphy (1990) present evidence that CEOs hold
a very limited amount of the ﬁrm’s shares, while Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and Tirole
(2005) discuss various rationales for this fact, ranging from managerial risk-aversion to fear
of shareholder lawsuits or public outcry (see however Remark 1, p. 17 on the case where
α = 0).
The following proposition establishes that, for any level of control contestability, an
appropriate level of explicit stakeholder protection can counter the CEO’s entrenchment
strategy:
Proposition 1 For any Γ > ∆θ(p+τ +λτ), there exist π0(Γ), π1(Γ), with 0 < π0 < π1 < 1,
such that, for any π ∈ [π0,π1), b xr(π) ∈ [0,1) is the threshold level of stakeholder protection
above which the incumbent CEO’s entrenchment strategy becomes unfeasible. The threshold
b xr is increasing in π and Γ, and decreasing in ∆θ and λ.
Proof. See the appendix.
Figure 2 depicts the function b xr(π) in the space (π,xr). Above the b xr(π) locus, the incum-
bent CEO never invests in stakeholder relationships. This is either because poor corporate
governance (low π) makes it easy for the CEO to preserve her job, or because explicit stake-
holder protection (xr high) makes stakeholders value less managerial concessions. Indeed,
15when faced with a potential alliance with the incumbent management, stakeholders trade
oﬀ the beneﬁt of managerial concessions against the cost of a less innovative management:
if they expect to receive a good treatment independently of who runs the ﬁrm, they have no
interest in the alliance with the incumbent CEO.
The b xr(π) locus is shifted downwards by an increase in ∆θ: ceteris paribus, social activists
are less likely to support more ineﬃcient incumbents. b xr also decreases as λ increases, as
stakeholders are more supportive of a control change when their interests are more in line
with an eﬃcient project choice. Conversely, b xr(π) is shifted upwards by an increase in Γ, as
larger private beneﬁts of control make incumbent managers more prone to build an alliance
with stakeholders, which in turn requires a stronger stakeholder protection to prevent the
alliance. Notice that, by Proposition 1, π0 < 1 if and only if Γ > ∆θ(p + τ + λτ). If
Γ ≤ ∆θ(p+τ +λτ), π0 ≥ 1, hence by Proposition 1 for any level of π ∈ [0,1], b xr(π) = 0, and
thus (even when xr = 0) no alliance arises between the ﬁrm’s CEO and its stakeholders. In
words, unless control beneﬁts are large enough, the incumbent CEO never ﬁnds it proﬁtable
to secure stakeholders’ support through concessions. As we are interested in the potential
alliance between managers and stakeholders, and the instruments to prevent it, we rule out
the latter case by making the following assumption:
Assumption 3
Γ > ∆θ(p + τ + λτ).
[Figure 2 about here.]
Let us assume that π and xr lie below the b xr(π) locus, so that the incumbent CEO
commits to a protection of stakeholders’ interests which goes beyond that to which the ﬁrm
itself is committed. We also assume that incumbent managers have no bargaining power
vis-` a-vis stakeholders, and thus CEOs’ commitment to stakeholder concessions equals xc:
x
∗
c = xc(xr) ≡
πa{Γ − ∆θ[p + τ − (1 − λ)τxr]}
(1 − π + πa)[θI(1 − λ)(1 − xr)τ]
. (5)
Straightforward calculations show that (∂x∗
c/∂π) > 0, (∂x∗
c/∂xr) > 0 and (∂x∗
c/∂λ) > 0.
Intuitively, a tougher replacement threat (e.g., an independent board or a ban on anti-
takeover defenses) makes the incumbent manager more willing to relinquish concessions
16to stakeholders in order to preserve control. The incumbent manager is also forced to
larger concessions when stakeholders’ welfare under the alternative manager is increased
due to a larger degree of stakeholder protection or a higher congruence of interests between
stakeholders and proﬁt-maximizing raiders.
Notice that since there is a bilateral monopoly between the stakeholders and the incum-
bent CEO, we could equally well assume a diﬀerent distribution of the bargaining power,
and thus choose any x∗
c ∈ [xc(xr),xc(xr)]. Assuming any interior Nash-bargaining solution
would, however, imply more cumbersome notation and algebra, while leaving the main re-
sults in the paper unaﬀected. The only case we need to rule out for our purposes is the one
where the CEO has all the bargaining power, and thus sets x∗
c = xc(xr). Indeed, as can be
seen from equation (3), in this case concessions would be completely independent from the
pressure that the market for corporate control exerts on CEOs (π). This assumption seems
to us less representative of the situation our model is meant to capture: a manager who
needs stakeholders’s support to fend oﬀ a replacement attempt is unlikely to hold all the
bargaining power vis-` a-vis stakeholders.
Remark 1 As emphasized at page 15, the size of the incumbent CEO’s stake (α) plays an
important role in our model. Indeed, for proposition 1 to hold we need α not to be too
large. At a ﬁrst sight, it might seem that imposing a null equity stake (and thus having that
Γ = ∞) would bring at no cost more straightforward results, by rendering assumption 3
automatically satisﬁed. However, the assumption α = 0 would come at the cost of obtaining
less empirically compelling predictions: ﬁrst, incumbent CEOs would be ready to make CSR
concessions to stakeholders even when faced with a very mild replacement threat (π small);
second, stakeholder activists would always be eager to support incumbent CEOs even when
the extent of legal stakeholder protection (xr) is very large.
Remark 2 According to (5) a non-null stakeholders’ ability to inﬂuence the replacement
attempt (a > 0) is crucial for the incumbent CEO to be willing to make concessions. Indeed,
if stakeholders were unable to aﬀect the outcome of the takeover or if shareholders had
more power in this respect (i.e. if a = 0), the incumbent would be unwilling to commit to
any meaningful concession vis-` a-vis stakeholders (i.e. xc = 0). As argued in section 2, the
evidence presented in the introduction suggests that the assumption a > 0 is well grounded
in reality.
174 Who beneﬁts from good corporate governance and
explicit stakeholder protection
We now build on the previous section to study how corporate governance rules enhancing
managerial turnover and explicit stakeholder protection aﬀect shareholder value, stakeholder
welfare, and CEOs’ rents. We argue that stakeholders and shareholders may to some extent
have congruent preferences over both issues.
4.1 Shareholder value, control contestability and stakeholder pro-
tection
In our model, small shareholders completely delegate control to managers, while an active
market for corporate control ensures that ineﬃcient managers are replaced. If social ac-
tivism can impair the functioning of this market, incumbent CEOs have an incentive to
secure stakeholders’ support by committing to a less eﬃcient project choice. This poten-
tial alliance changes dramatically shareholders’ preferences over corporate governance and
explicit stakeholder protection, as the results in this section show.
We proceed in the following way. We start by assuming that the ﬁrm’s CEO chooses
to entrench by making concessions to stakeholders. Next, we ask which levels of π and xr
maximize shareholder value under the constraint that managerial entrenchment is countered
(Proposition 2). Hence, we turn to the opposite case where managerial entrenchment is
allowed (Proposition 3). Finally, we compare shareholder value in the two cases and ﬁnd
conditions such that it is optimal to counter managerial entrenchment via explicit stakeholder
protection (Proposition 4).
Proposition 2 Suppose managerial entrenchment is to be countered. Then, shareholder
value is concave in π, and is maximized when control contestability is set equal to π∗ < 1 and
the minimal level of protection b xr(π∗) ∈ [0,1) is provided to stakeholders. π∗ is decreasing
in Γ and a and increasing in λ.
Proof. See the appendix.
The intuition for the above result is as follows. In contrast with section 2.2, when man-
agers can entrench themselves by committing to a socially responsible behavior, shareholder
value is a non monotone, rather than increasing, function of π (i.e. increasing for low val-
ues of π and decreasing as π becomes larger). Indeed, as π increases two oﬀsetting eﬀects
18impinge on shareholder value. On the one hand, shareholders beneﬁt from the opportunity
to replace the incumbent CEO with a more talented manager. This, in turn, has a positive
impact on shareholder value. However, as π increases, the cost of countering managerial
entrenchment via explicit stakeholder protection increases as well, to the extent that the
incumbent has stronger incentives to seek stakeholders’ support when faced with a tougher
takeover threat. This latter eﬀect has a negative impact on shareholder value. As a result
of these two contrasting eﬀects, shareholder value is maximized when competition in the
managerial labor market is not too intense (i.e. π is strictly lower than 1).
Proposition 3 Suppose managerial entrenchment is not to be countered. Then, shareholder






1 if aΓ < ∆θ(p + τ),
0 if aΓ ≥ ∆θ(p + τ).
Proof. See the appendix.
According to the above result, if managerial entrenchment is not to be countered, it is
clearly in the shareholders’ best interest not to provide explicit protection to stakeholders.
Indeed, absent the need to compete with managerial concessions, any form of stakeholder
protection negatively aﬀects shareholder value. As a consequence, shareholder value is a
monotonic function of π. If private beneﬁts of control are small, and social activism is not
very eﬀective, a tougher replacement threat does not spur larger concessions to stakehold-
ers, while leading more often to an eﬃcient CEO replacement; hence, shareholder value is
maximized by π = 1. If, on the other hand, stakeholders pressure is very eﬀective and pri-
vate beneﬁts of control are large, shareholders are better oﬀ insulating the incumbent from
competition, ensuring him tenure.
Finally, the following result ﬁnds a suﬃcient condition under which countering managerial
entrenchment through explicit stakeholder protection is indeed in the interest of shareholders.
Proposition 4 If aΓ ≥ min{∆θ(p + τ),τθR(1 − λ)}, shareholder value is maximized when
a minimal level of explicit protection b xr(π∗) ∈ [0,1) is secured to stakeholders.
Proof. See the appendix.
When private beneﬁts of control are large and social activists are powerful, shareholders
are better oﬀ if explicit protection is granted to stakeholders, so as to prevent a very eﬀective
19managerial entrenchment strategy. Though such protection implies a less eﬃcient project
choice, shareholders beneﬁt anyway due to the higher CEO quality induced by managerial
turnover. Notice that in this case, the corporate pie (inclusive of stakeholder welfare) is
increased at the expense of incumbent managers, though some shareholder value is lost to
stakeholders. Shareholders thus get a smaller share of a larger pie. Proposition 2 also states
that shareholder value is maximized by not putting CEOs under a very tough replacement
threat, namely, by choosing π∗ < 1 (see example 1). The optimal levels of π and xr decrease
with Γ and a. Thus, as Γ and a get very large, it is optimal to set π∗ close to zero, in that
insulating incumbent managers from competition becomes a less costly way to ﬁght man-
agerial entrenchment than institutionalizing stakeholder protection (see example 2). This
case captures the intuition that sometimes shareholders may prevent ineﬃcient entrench-
ment strategies simply by “granting the CEO some insulation from competition for his job,”
an idea advanced in the corporate governance literature by Shleifer and Vishny (1989).
Example 1 In ﬁgure 3 panel (a) we set θI = .1, θR = .5, α = .5, p = .5, τ = .5, λ = .1,
a = .3, B = .1 and Γ = 2. With these parameters π∗ = 0.18 and b xr(π∗) = 0.49.
Example 2 In ﬁgure 3 panel (b) we keep the same data of example 1 but assume that the
stakeholder ability at aﬀecting the replacement decision is higher (i.e. we set a = .9). In
this case: π∗ = 0.017 and b xr(π∗) = 0.03.
Notice that in both examples shareholder value is indeed maximized by countering man-
agerial entrenchment (i.e., it is not optimal to set π and xr below the b xr(π) locus).
[Figure 3 about here.]
4.2 Stakeholder welfare and control contestability
The stakeholder welfare function changes according to whether xr and π lie below or above
the locus b xr(π). By Proposition 1, whenever xr ≥ b xr(π), WST coincides with (2); hence, it
is increasing in xr as well as π: stakeholders can only beneﬁt from the replacement of an
ineﬃcient manager. When instead xr < b xr(π), stakeholders’ welfare writes as:
WST(π,xr) =
[θI + π(1 − a)∆θ][λ + (1 − λ)xr]B + (1 − π(1 − a))θI(1 − xr)(1 − λ)x
∗
c(π,xr)B,
20which is also increasing in π and xr. Notice that the additional term with respect to (2)
represents the beneﬁt of managerial concessions: stakeholders now have an additional motive
for endorsing good corporate governance, to the extent that the incumbent’s concessions are
an increasing function of π. Indeed, bad corporate governance rules allowing anti-takeover
defenses and staggered boards make CEOs less eager to appeal to stakeholders, in that they
do not need stakeholders’ support to buttress their positions. This implies that even those
stakeholders who would support incumbent CEOs in return for concessions prefer the ﬁrm’s
control to be contestable ex ante:
Corollary 1 Although stakeholder activists may want to side with the incumbent CEO at
t=1, their welfare is always increasing in the quality of corporate governance rules enhancing
managerial turnover.
Corollary 1 adds a further argument to a common view on the use of anti-takeover de-
fenses: “...who beneﬁts from such protection against outside bids? Not shareholders, who
lose their chance to vote on a change of management; and not employees or other stakehold-
ers, whose interests may be better served by a new and more dynamic ownership. The only
beneﬁciaries from obstacles to a market in corporate control are managers.” (“Takeover Trou-
bles,” The Economist, January 31st, 2002). Our result also rationalizes the recent interest
of social and environmental activists for the corporate governance agenda, and in particu-
lar the puzzling fact that activists advocate pro-takeover reforms of corporate charters (see
footnote 8).
4.3 CEO’s utility and stakeholder protection
Interestingly, ineﬃcient CEOs have opposite preferences with respect to stakeholders over
corporate governance and stakeholder protection rules. Indeed, the results in section 3 imply
the following result:
Corollary 2 The incumbent manager always beneﬁts from a reduction in the intensity of
the replacement threat and from a reduction in explicit stakeholder protection.
That CEOs may be opposed to tough competition in the managerial labor market is
not surprising. Here we would rather stress the result that CEOs prone to make personal
commitments to stakeholder representatives (which is the case whenever xr < b xr(π)) are
indeed opposed to welcome stakeholder-protection laws, or the introduction of explicit pro-
stakeholder covenants in the ﬁrm’s charter. This ﬁnding is in line with casual evidence of
21managers who profess concerns for corporate social responsibility, but are then reluctant to
endorse pro-stakeholder regulations and all “attempts to institutionalize considerations of
stakeholder interests in corporate governance” (see Hellwig 2000). It also supports Shleifer
and Vishny (1989)’s informal argument that entrenchment objectives may explain why man-
agers try to make the ﬁrm’s contracts with stakeholders implicit rather than explicit. 18
5 Discussion and concluding remarks
In this paper we have argued that shareholders’ interests are better served when the pro-
tection of stakeholders is not left to CEOs’ discretion. Incumbent managers under a tough
replacement threat may in fact use relationships with stakeholder activists as an eﬀective
entrenchment strategy. Our model hence predicts that in countries where good corporate
governance promotes the market for corporate control and social activism is very eﬀective,
introducing some explicit stakeholder protection may increase ﬁrm value. This ﬁnding pro-
vides a rationale for a recent phenomenon whereby a growing number of ﬁrms are submitting
their ethical behavior to the monitoring of ethic indexes and social auditors, in an attempt
to commit to protect stakeholders’ interests beyond current regulatory mandates.
We emphasize that - in contrast to the common wisdom explanation for this phenomenon,
i.e. that shareholders endorse CSR simply to prevent costly boycotts - our model provides
testable predictions on the interaction among shareholder value, corporate governance fac-
tors, and CSR. In particular, we predict that ﬁrms’ incentives to undergo ethical screening for
inclusion in sustainability indexes and to submit their behavior to social audits are stronger
when corporate control is more contestable. We also predict that when activists’ power is
strong, shareholders should forego the explicit protection of stakeholder rights and rather
insulate CEOs from competition, for instance by allowing for anti-takeover provisions in the
corporate charter.
Our theory is closely related to Pagano and Volpin (2005a), who argue that in the face
of a takeover threat incumbent managers are natural allies of workers: incumbents have an
interest in oﬀering long-term contracts to workers so as to discourage the takeover, while
unions are prone to support a poorly-monitoring manager against a more eﬃcient raider.
In that paper, managerial eﬀort is instrumental to reducing workers’ wages, hence takeover
gains occur via a reduction in stakeholder welfare. 19 This has two natural implications.
First, workers are always opposed to rules favoring control contestability. Second, incumbent
managers can only gain (and shareholders lose) from an increase in employment protection,
22to the extent that long term labor contracts can be used as poison pills to deter takeovers. We
derived opposite predictions in a model where raiders increase the corporate pie rather than
simply redistribute it from stakeholders to shareholders. This derives from our assumptions
that the raider discovers a highly proﬁtable project more often than the incumbent manager,
and that such project sometimes coincides with stakeholders’ favorite one. Indeed, it is this
feature of our model that leaves room for a congruence of interests between shareholders and
stakeholders over corporate governance and stakeholder protection regimes. In this respect,
it is interesting to note that as λ gets close to zero (i.e., extra proﬁts always come at the
expense of stakeholder welfare), our model yields similar predictions to Pagano and Volpin
(2005a): explicit stakeholder protection is no longer beneﬁcial to shareholders.
A straightforward extension of our model would be to allow for a takeover contest be-
tween two competing raiders diﬀerently related to the target’s stakeholders, rather than a
ﬁght between an incumbent CEO and an outside raider. Our story would then suggest that
the outcome of the takeover contest may be deeply aﬀected when one of the two contenders
has managed to build a privileged relationship with stakeholders and has thus gained their
support. This extension would help rationalize the events that occurred during the contro-
versial takeover battles that took place in the Italian banking industry in 2005. 20
To conclude, our results can be applied to a political economy framework where interest
groups (shareholders, incumbent managers and stakeholders) contribute to determine ﬁnan-
cial regulation and institutional stakeholder protection. Our results suggest that besides
endorsing a better corporate governance regime, small shareholders may want to support
the introduction of stakeholder protection laws to prevent the implicit agreement between
ineﬃcient managers and stakeholders. We leave this and other extensions for future research.
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Proof of proposition 1
Deﬁne b xr(π) as the level of explicit stakeholder protection such that xc(xr) = xc(xr):
b xr(π) =
[Γ − ∆θ(p + τ + λτ)]πa − λτ∆θ(1 − π)
(1 − λ)τ∆θ(1 − π)
. (6)
When xr > b xr(π), xc > xc, and thus the alliance between incumbent CEO and stakeholders
is not feasible. By inspection of (6), b xr(π) < 1 if and only if π < π1 ≡ τ∆θ/(τ∆θ + a(Γ −
∆θ(p + τ + λτ))). Hence, if π ≥ π1 no feasible level of stakeholder protection can counter
the CEO’s entrenchment strategy. Also, b xr(π) > 0 if and only if π > π0 ≡ λτ∆θ/(λτ∆θ +
a(Γ − ∆θ(p + τ + λτ))). When π ≤ π0, the alliance does not arise, even at xr = 0. The
assumption Γ > ∆θ(p + τ + λτ) guarantees that π0 ∈ (0,1) and π1 ∈ (0,1). Since λ < 1,













and the latter expression is negative if and only if
π < ˜ π ≡
τ∆θ
(1 − a)τ∆θ + a(Γ − (p + τ)∆θ)
.
As ˜ π > π1, and for b xr(π) ∈ [0,1) it must be that π ∈ [π0,π1), the result follows.
Proof of proposition 2
Let H1 = ∆θ(p+τ(1+λ)) and H2 = ∆θ(1−a)(p+τ(1+λ))+aΓ where ∆θ = θR −θI.
If managerial entrenchment is to be countered, using (1) shareholder value writes as













The ﬁrst order condition for an interior solution to the shareholder value maximization





2∆θH2 − 2π∆θH2 − (θIH2 − θRH1)

= 0.
Solving for π∗ we obtain
π1,2 = 1 ±
s
θRa(Γ − ∆θ(p + τ(1 + λ)))
∆θ(aΓ + ∆θ(1 − a)(p + τ(1 + λ)))
.
By assumption 3, Γ > ∆θ(p+τ(1+λ)), and the optimal level of corporate governance quality
is given by






θRa(Γ − ∆θ(p + τ(1 + λ)))
∆θ(aΓ + ∆θ(1 − a)(p + τ(1 + λ)))
. (7)
If b π ≤ π0 (b π ≥ π1) shareholders choose π∗ = π0 (π∗ = π1), otherwise π∗ = b π. Notice that
π∗ ∈ [π0,π1) ⊂ (0,1) is decreasing both in a and Γ. To see that π∗ increases in λ consider















τ∆θa(Γ − (p + τ)∆θ)
[λτ∆θ + a(Γ − ∆θ(p + τ(1 + λ)))]2 > 0.
Therefore, for all π∗ ∈ [π0,π1), (∂π∗/∂λ) > 0.
Proof of proposition 3
When managerial entrenchment is not to be countered, shareholder value is given by
VSH(xc(π)) = (πa + 1 − π)(θIR(p + τ − (1 − λ)xcτ)) + π(1 − a)θRR(p + τ)
= ((p + τ)θI − πa(Γ − ∆θ(p + τ)))R + (1 − a)π(p + τ)R∆θ, (8)
as by inspection of (4) xc is increasing in xr and thus in this case shareholders optimally
27choose xr = 0. Diﬀerentiating (8) with respect to π yields
V
0
SH(xc(π)) = R(−aΓ + ∆θ(p + τ)). (9)
From (9) it is immediate that shareholders’ value is maximized with no control contestability
if and only if aΓ > (p + τ)∆θ.
Proof of proposition 4
If aΓ > ∆θ(p+τ), then VSH(xc(π))0 < 0 and π = 0 is optimal if managerial entrenchment
is not to be countered. However, by inspection VSH(xc(0)) ≡ RθI(p + τ) = VSH(b xr(0)) ≡
RθI(p + τ) ≤ VSH(b xr(π∗)). When aΓ = ∆θ(p + τ), VSH(xc(0)) = RθI(p + τ) and the result
follows.
Assume now that aΓ < ∆θ(p + τ), then VSH(xc(π))0 > 0. In this case if managerial
entrenchment is not countered, then π = 1 is the shareholders’ optimal choice. As
VSH(b xr(π1)) =
R(p + λτ)(aθI(Γ − (p + τ(1 + λ))∆θ) + ∆θτθR)
a(Γ − (p + τ(1 + λ))∆θ) + τ∆θ
,
and VSH(xc(1)) = R(−aΓ+(p+τ)θR), VSH(b xr(π1)) > VSH(xx(1)) only if aΓ > τθR(1−λ). A
suﬃcient condition for (p+τ)∆θ > τθR(1−λ) is that 0 < τ < min{1−p,p∆θ/(θI −λθR)}.
28Notes
1Dyck and Zingales (2002) provide empirical evidence that social activists eﬀectively use the media to
have an impact on corporate policies. Feddersen and Gilligan (2001) and John and Klein (2003) start from
this premise to build models of social activism and costly boycotts.
2Washington Post, August 30, 1987.
3See Coﬀee (1999) for a discussion of recent European (and in particular, Italian) takeover reforms favoring
control contestability.
4Namely, workers, consumers, local communities and potential pollutees. Although most of the litera-
ture has focused on the relationship between ﬁrms and workers (see Blair 1995, Blair and Roe 1999, and
Hansmann 1996), the recent debate on the stakeholder society concept has unveiled the importance of other
constituencies.
5A further example of shareholders’ endorsement of CSR is the following: in the US, The Corporate Sun-
shine Working Group, an alliance between institutional investors, environmental organizations and unions,
is asking the SEC to expand corporate social and environmental disclosure requirements. Also, as reported
by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), resolutions ﬁled by socially responsible shareholders
are often endorsed by institutional shareholders that have long been associated with shareholder-value en-
hancing activism, like CalPERS. For interesting evidence on shareholder activism on social issues, see IRRC
(2000).
6For example Business Ethics, a publication on socially responsible business, ranks ﬁrst the need for
independent auditors within its list of guidelines to reform US corporations. In a note dedicated to the
use of shareholder resolutions by NGOs as a tool of pressure on corporations, Friends of the Earth re-
ports that “socially-oriented shareholders often link social issues to corporate governance issues.” The Rose
Foundation for the Communities and the Environment has recently used its shareholdings in corpora-
tions to pressure in favor of social responsibility, but also for more independent boards (see respectively
http://www.business-ethics.com, http://www.foe.org, http://www.rosefdn.org).
7According to the Social Investment Forum, socially responsible investment funds as a category sup-
port governance-related resolutions (especially those aimed at the removal of poison pills) more than their
“conventional” peers. See “Mutual Funds, Proxy Voting, and Fiduciary Responsibility: How do Funds
Rate on Voting their Proxies and Disclosure Practices?” Social Investment Forum, April, 2005 available at
http://www.socialinvest.org.
8According to the Social Investment Forum, socially responsible investment funds as a category sup-
port governance-related resolutions (especially those aimed at the removal of poison pills) more than their
“conventional” peers. See “Mutual Funds, Proxy Voting, and Fiduciary Responsibility: How do Funds
Rate on Voting their Proxies and Disclosure Practices?” Social Investment Forum, April, 2005 available at
http://www.socialinvest.org.
9B can be thought of as the foregone pollution with respect to the status quo project, the value of
preserved employment for a local community, or the value of additional product safety for consumers.
10This modeling choice follows Aghion and Tirole (1997)’s lines in capturing the idea that parties in a
relationship may have a partial congruence of interests over the course of action to be taken.
11We thank an anonymous Referee for raising this issue.
2912This descends from the assumptions that some projects yield a negative payoﬀ to stakeholders, and that
projects all look alike ex-ante. Hence, the regulator would not make any recommendation if uninformed.
13This seems to be a reasonable description of what determines the extent of regulatory agencies’ inter-
ference in ﬁrms’ activity, at least in the perception of social activists. Environmental activists consider the
Environmental Protection Agency’s budget as a crucial variable to be monitored. Friends of the Earth,
a powerful US environmentalist organization, has recently argued that the Bush administration’s cuts to
the EPA budget may damage EPA’s ability to make and enforce recommendations and environmental laws.
Among all budget cuts, the most criticized are those to the Oﬃce of Science and Technology, which provides
scientiﬁc backbone to EPA’s regulatory decisions and actions, and those to EPA’s enforcement oﬃce (see
http://www.foe.org).
14 Although many hint at a “natural alliance” between stakeholders and ineﬃcient CEOs (see for instance
Hellwig 2000), to us it is not obvious that stakeholders need beneﬁt from managerial ineﬃciency. For instance,
consumers may be better oﬀ when a more innovative manager takes over to improve the ﬁrm’s products.
Potential pollutees may well be more aligned to shareholders concerned with future environmental liabilities,
rather than to a myopic manager with poor incentives to invest in discovering green production processes.
Against common wisdom, hostile takeovers enhancing eﬃciency in the oil industry often lead to curtailment of
excessive exploration. Probably, it is not managerial ineﬃciency per se that pleases stakeholders; managerial
concessions do.
15Investment in “green expertise” is becoming a fashionable strategy for many corporate oﬃcers. In an
interview with McKinsey consultants, the C.E.O. of Dow Chemical Company (a leader in the voluntary
adoption of environmentally-friendly strategies) stated that he allocates about 25 percent of his time to
handling environmental issues. He also reported on his dialogue with stakeholders: “[I created] a panel for
the corporation on a worldwide basis. It includes academics, environmentalists, a former EPA director, (...)
and it worked: we have learnt from the panel, and they have learnt from us.” (“What is Environmental
Strategy?”, The McKinsey Quarterly, 1993, 4: 53–68)
16One may object that the raider could as well achieve a commitment to adopt socially responsible policies
in case he takes over the ﬁrm. Yet, we argue that incumbent CEOs are often in a better position than outside
raiders to build privileged relationships with the ﬁrm’s relevant stakeholder constituencies. This is a realistic
assumption in conglomerate and cross-border takeovers, where the raider and the target belong to diﬀerent
industries or geographical areas. For instance, our story well describes the European phenomenon whereby
“locally-rooted” CEOs enjoyed the support of media and politicians against foreign raiders in recent takeover
contests in the telecoms, banking and energy industries.
17Endogenizing the size of the CEO’s equityholdings, and thus analyzing the more complex interaction
between control contestability, the design of managerial remuneration, and entrenchment-motivated CSR,
lies beyond the scope of the paper.
18“Implicit contracts are often backed up by the manager’s personal reputation rather than the ﬁrm’s, so
that the manager rather than the corporation owns the valuable trust of the other contracting party.” See
Shleifer and Vishny (1989), page 132.
19Whether takeovers can only create value by reducing stakeholder welfare is largely an empirical question:
while evidence on the eﬀects on the wage bill is mixed (see Becker, 1995 and Bhagat, Shleifer and Vishny 1990,
but also Jarrell, Brickley and Jeﬀry 1988 and Rosett 1990) casual observations suggest that hostile takeovers
30may well beneﬁt natural stakeholders like consumers and potential pollutees, as argued in footnote 14.
20A case in point is the battle over Antonveneta, where a locally rooted manager, Gianpiero Fiorani, relied
on the support of local communities, part of the media and institutions, in his attempt to seize control of
the bank against a competing bid by ABN Amro. The Northern League, a political party representing the
interests of Northern Italy’s local communities, showed strong concerns that ABN Amro’s acquisition might
negatively aﬀect the funding of small and medium enterprises in that area. In response to these claims,
ABN Amro’s CEO Rijkman Groenink publicly pledged that were his bid to succeed he would maintain
Antonveneta’s support for the local economy, but initially failed to convince the relevant constituencies and
to seize control. ABN Amro eventually managed to acquire control of Antonveneta, after Italian judges froze
Fiorani’s voting rights on the grounds that he had illegaly acquired his toehold in the ﬁrm. See Financial
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Figure 3: The continuous (dotted) curve represents shareholder value when entrenchment is
(not) countered. In panel (a) shareholders preempt entrenchment: π∗ = 0.18 and b xr(π∗) =




λ (p + τ)R,B pR,0
1 − λ (p + τ)R,0 pR,B
Table 1: Expected monetary proﬁts and private beneﬁts accruing to shareholders and stake-
holders depending on the selected project and the degree of congruence λ.
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